

Mysterious Threat Actor Used Chalubo Malware to Brick 600,000 Routers

Date: 03rd June 2024 | Severity: High

Summary

More than 600,000 small office/home office (SOHO) routers belonging to the same ISP were rendered inoperable in a single destructive event, Lumen Technologies reports.

Attack Vectors

The impacted router models, from ActionTec and Sagemcom, were confined to the ISP's autonomous system number (ASN), and were likely infected with Chalubo, a remote access trojan (RAT) that ensnares devices into a botnet.

The destructive incident occurred over a 72-hour period between October 25 and October 27, 2023, and impacted ActionTec T3200s, ActionTec T3260s, and Sagemcom F5380 router models.

The unique event, Lumen says, resulted in roughly 49% of the impacted ASNs modems being taken offline, with the affected devices having to be physically replaced. Overall, roughly 179,000 ActionTec and 480,000 Sagemcom routers might have been bricked. "We assess with high confidence that the malicious firmware update was a deliberate act intended to cause an outage, and though we expected to see a number of routers make and models affected across the internet, this event was confined to the single ASN," Lumen notes.

The threat actor responsible for the attack, Lumen says, likely chose Chalubo to deploy malicious firmware on the impacted routers to obfuscate attribution, but no evidence of overlaps between this incident and known nation-state actors, such as Volt Typhoon, has been found.

Indicator of compromise

INDICATOR TYPE	INDICATORS
File Hashes	 30584f13c0a9d0c86562c803de350432d5a0607a06b24481ad4d92cdf7288213 7bd723b5e4f7b3c645ac04e763dfc913060eaf6e136eecc4ee0653ad2056f3a0
	• d7f3ecd8939ae8b170b641448ff12ade2163baad05ca6595547f8794b5ad013b
	 36ea1b317b46c55ed01dd860131a7f6a216de71958520d7d558711e13693c9dc 8e45daace21f135b54c515dbd5cf6e0bd28ae2515b9d724ad2d01a4bf10f93bd
	• bdef8e089ffa00794f40f14ad3cdb8f1629241a4ac313bef8fe3d38e08207e4c

	 0f863f624da0d74094cb0f91cc226281 08dd3d407a74159c2de0f6be0956a79625bdeb2f913d04520d1f8f310d6a78fc 21d9ae29551dcbe39de375bdf8ada5a47b0e2372 b2e2193e49ee1240be30f5040dbb5e2c973cdfb02c3ea88ef4ffeda884de28c2 6c6609264e9e4b365e1bd7df187f4405a1df3f02 00550d5c2ed14a445ae13cff8eff32ba7a7dd502d145481bcd18161cf1df540d ce68c3687aae08b796e3e57d97d4f333991b6eba804581ae66f46dbd6ec7dae7 b9d31125782ca0f20162b9f86b034a34cdc6b3fe318ee990721dc7d7dae66d22 5b7874b18e8365e07624946a33518988aea4c72478a285a36047b4ba554a7576
Domain	 lighten[.]medyamol[.]com lakusdvroa[.]com checkqazxsw1[.]com axon-stall[.]riddlecamera[.]net
URL	 http://193[[.]]201[[.]]224[[.]]238:8852/RTEGFN01/powerpc http://mnbvcxzzz12[[.]]com:8852/RTEGF/powerpc https://efbthmoiuykmkjkjgt[[.]]com:8852/RTEGFN01/arm http://91[[.]]211[[.]]88[[.]]225:8080/SASBCKXOWYALLCZXF http://hackucdt[[.]]com:8852/test/res[[.]]dat http://sainnguatc[[.]]com:8080/ASUHALUMNABTC http://coreconf[[.]]net:8080/E2XRIEGSOAPU3Z5Q8 http://185[[.]]189[[.]]240[[.]]13:8080/E2XRIEGSOAPU3Z5Q8/res[[.]]dat http://efbthmoiuykmkjkjgt[[.]]com:8852/RTEGFN01/mips http://poiuytyuiopkjfnf[[.]]com:8852/ASDFRE/x86_64 http://coreconf[[.]]net:8080/E2XRIEGSOAPU3Z5Q8/mips http://193[[.]]201[[.]]224[[.]]238:8852/RTEGFN01/mipsel http://103[.]51[.]13[.]52:8852/test/res[.]dat http://193[.]201[.]224[.]238:8852/GHJFFGND/mips64 http://mnbvcxzzz12[.]com:8852/RTEGF/mips64
IP Address	 2[.]59[.]222[.]102 104[.]233[.]167[.]63 103[.]117[.]145[.]106 2[.]59[.]223[.]226 2[.]59[.]223[.]253 38[.]54[.]27[.]204 45[.]116[.]160[.]100 216[.]118[.]241[.]204 103[.]84[.]84[.]250 116[.]213[.]39[.]3 103[.]244[.]2[.]218 104[.]233[.]167[.]62 141[.]193[.]159[.]10 116[.]213[.]39[.]2 103[.]244[.]2[.]170 45[.]10[.]90[.]89

Recommendation

- Block the attached IOCs on network and use the latest Threat Intelligence data to stay aware of actual TTPs and IOCs used by threat actors.
- Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
- Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, VPN, and accounts that access critical systems.
- Regularly patch and update software and applications to their latest version and conduct regular vulnerability assessments.

NOTE: The recommended settings/controls should be implemented after due shall be tested on Pre-Prod or test environment before implementing. diligence and impact analysis.

Reference Links

- https://www.securityweek.com/mysterious-threat-actor-uses-chalubo-malware-to-brick-600000-routers/
- https://www.wired.com/story/mysterious-hack-600000-routers-destroyed/
- https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2024/06/02/hacker-bricks-600000-routers-in-just-72-hours/?sh=5ffd90906320