

The FROZEN#SHADOW campaign

Date: 26th April 2024 | Severity: High

Summary

The FROZEN#SHADOW campaign was first reported by cybersecurity researchers in April 2024. The campaign targets entitiaes in Asia, Europe, and the Americas.

Attack Vectors

- The FROZEN#SHADOW operators gain initial system access using phishing email messages embedded with malicious links. The links lead to the retrieval of an obfuscated JavaScript file from a remote URL. The script executes a command through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to map the victim's network drive, and then remotely installs an MSI package from the mapped network drive using msiexec.exe (the MSI file closely resembles the BazarBackdoor malware). Once the file is executed, a payload of the SSLoad malware is downloaded and executed through the Rundll32.exe process. To evade detection, the malware file is digitally signed with a fake certificate of the Malwarebytes Anti-Exploit software.
- SSLoad connects to a command and control (C2) server, and then starts exfiltrating system and user data
 for both the local host and domain over HTTPS. In addition, the malware executes various commands to
 prepare the victim's environment for the deployment of next-stage payloads, including Cobalt Strike and
 remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, such as ScreenConnect. Using these tools, the
 threat actors move laterally to other systems within the domain while harvesting credentials and other
 critical system details. Eventually, the attackers completely take over the victim's Windows domain by
 creating their own domain admin account.

Indicator of compromise

INDICATOR TYPE	INDICATORS
File Hash	 17ddc339b14845bc9d67c5c3cd9a0e617387cc0569131ff3641035d82043effa 9629e313a6299e600ff2c6086a24e3ad6ff6ba59 fc21a125287c3539e11408587bcaa6f3b54784d9d458facbc54994f05d7ef1b0 ba3fa920708db856737a66f70e2c7e86bba73c73836f7f30c2ce42cd70d0c5bd 24cb279eebcd49e1327905ab2bd19b9b2e09efa3e0a5e1875f3989c398a5da81 c189e585a4aea11380082f7c25aef6b8

	• 7f97adff1d298ccf1f3c7991fcb01008dda22722ebbc11af48fcbf2adb58afb4 • 52cae521d7a808c8206f4b5afd6b037bc573b50e • 791c28d4201e8b9ea5162fbee3908feb34793b1c51f5aaedc43916e86068248d • 805b59e48af90504024f70124d850870a69b822b8e34d1ee551353c42a338bf7 • 3d84e7bdd40cd41df467830563d0f62779469a1b • 2118c5b95d5d57492b2e8b8c0403e23b21acc4ff50282f8b6007ba89adfaa992 • 3584ca9c1e7e0a38e47f59bb16c21203a60833d0f826294d535a98e7ca76d9c1 • 09e7f7428e6ecc68ef036c0751f53985882f6760cf3892f1d26af44f3b9730de • 7dff08656413a737483ecee2a50e412338ebfee3d36a1a5c04e74b25949b2306 • 98856816a9d14d3b7db32f30b07624e4bcda7f1e265a7bb7a3e3476bfd54a759 • 4d81be09c23e02fab7364e508c21c111 • 29a0f183b8352154315af0568ce3806a • ae610eb8f8622653b9be9692a7d2a680b0c2154022704ca58af0eaeed0066d03 • 7206eafc475f246e7c9c258afdaaa64b5193c1c7427d927be417e53dec890078 • a557f891f4d50e458d745c7eaf7d0be3eceea36f0398097e977cd3f6ec463875 • 18d60c9c807da021bc2c31e3ba7ec2737865a8c96060134ca3af03a43e26fe • 96212917b7b0dc881332db7ece0bacfe21d9ac713af1abe078f6d3e74baacd01 • 0737fa0b403fab17331c9835497af3b2955543e2fac85009dcc66df41a015f8 • 780b970dad15835d138546be9b615fc1b4124c1060a8efd91b9c52f9c3160d5b • 232f8f8dc9e5b9723c43c78cb942c810ef56e305e4bd650110a484334f568a8 • b28a478eb5b99efcdc7caf428bffb89a • d4674ab328c69dc0fb721d7d4520574f • 6d7a94b7551f15732e193a07357375b98b463f0dce6b1fed871a42fcbdde9f48 • d174e68fe345826e263deeeb15e • 7dbebb7c76511fc063b5ace0a9359b655f6a55a494200b8fd11905c78b5fb90 • d394c7b8fe15753bfff79fb4f648f6f8bae70f9 • f5bf914415faf7587958bbdc3312536fd9abea647f1541d44d2e757f0e683650 • f8fc9b40b946b742d6044f291914439727e1a7f53ea87562446f682b26cce65a • 68e1caf530366b1890993185157c01161b3d625063d75a41c88d2d1bb8edfe02 • e259102dc1ddd3d465c8b911313910c983586197 • ec183d55d6c11480bc167da468a526fa • caf8295570e88244c7099a8eabfd1bd55ea50f026b4461e9f0f5425d54703e8 • 4f52b4a2a781f366ed534d8c4b2fafef48a7848c4c20b4229b98747ca8ab06d3 • 632832e012f067a3ffb27ed4fe6803f740c80f6f65213fe55507f0cd1ee0019b96 • 2b026343214c3d2c10fdfa9b04b7694e57ee8d3605fbf9a2e127fe6fa9a58309
Domain	 sokingscrosshotel[.]com titnovacrion[.]top winarkamaps[.]com skinnyjeanso[.]com globalsolutionunlimitedltd[.]com krd6[.]com maramaravilha[.]com stratimasesstr[.]com bjsdg0[.]pintaexoticfashion[.]co.in wireoneinternet[.]info danteshpk[.]com kasnackamarch[.]info simplyfitphilly[.]com
IP	 45.95.11[.]134 85.239.54[.]190 23.95.209[.]148 23.159.160[.]88

Recommendation

- Submit the File Hash to the Antivirus team to update their database with the file hashes.
- Submit the IPs to Network team to block in the firewall.
- Block the Domain in the Proxy.
- Make regular backups of important and critical files.
- Avoid downloading files or attachments from external sources, especially if the source was unsolicited. Common file types include zip, rar, iso, and pdf. Zip files were used during this campaign.
- Monitor common malware staging directories, especially script-related activity in world- writable directories. In the case of this campaign the threat actors staged in subdirectories in C:\ProgramData as well as the user's %APPDATA%
- Through various phases of the FROZEN#SHADOW campaign, the threat actors leveraged encrypted channels over port 443 to evade detection. Because of this, we strongly recommend deploying robust endpoint logging capabilities. This includes leveraging additional process-level logging such as Sysmon and PowerShell logging for additional log detection coverage.

NOTE: The recommended settings/controls should be implemented after due shall be tested on Pre-Prod or test environment before implementing. diligence and impact analysis.

Reference Links

- https://www.securonix.com/blog/securonix-threat-research-security-advisory-frozenshadow-attack-campaign/
- https://dashboard.ti.insight.rapid7.com/#/tip/cyber-term/662a2dba9edcffc72a633f0f